A Final Push

D+3 | 23 July 1989, 14:00hrs - 18:00hrs vs @ Bad Windsheim

After the successful linkup of the 7^th East-German Panzer Division and the 39^th Soviet Motorized Rifle Division, it became a question of when would the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division start its lunge towards Nürnberg. Recon informed NATO that the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division was reorganizing its forces. It was assumed that this meant that NATO could expect an attack towards the city from the west along with a pincer movement from the South by the Czechoslovakian forces eventually linking up with the Soviets. This would not only isolate Nürnberg but also pocket a substantial number of NATO forces.

Not wanting to be second-guessed, Pact command was thinking along different lines. The delay caused by the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division having to reorganize made the attack towards Nürnberg a problematic affair. NATO defenses had solidified to such an extent that there was a real danger of the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division being wiped out without getting anywhere near its objective. On the other hand, the attack on the Fulda Gap was showing great promise, and this was the determining factor in their decisions regarding the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division's future operations.

At the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division's HQ, there was a substantial degree of worry. There was some cautious optimism after the linking up with the 7^th Panzer Division, but they were conscious that the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division had been seriously mauled in previous actions. With second-echelon forces arriving, they hoped that they would now fall into a support role. It was not meant to be. They were instructed to do a last push west. In what was seen by them as a sacrificial move, the division was to attack towards Bad-Windsheim. Deep reconnaissance showed a void being created between the NATO forward defense forces and the reinforcements. The 39^th Motorized Rifle Division was to exploit this hole. Their objective was to create as much chaos as possible and, as a secondary objective, to exploit in depth. Their much-battered regiments, having been consolidated and reassembled, once again were ready to plunge head-on into the NATO defenses.

Bad Windsheim had so far been a quiet area. The US 1^st Armored Division had taken responsibility for the area in the early hours of the war, but as the 39^th Motorized Rifle Division pushed deeper, the area's defense was taken over by the 3^rd Infantry Division. The 3^rd Infantry Division was in the peculiar situation that operational boundary forces find themselves in. It had to keep an eye on the US V Army operations to the north and on the US VII Army operations to the South. Stretched between two different axes, the 3^rd Infantry Division assigned the Bad Windsheim area to their 2^nd Brigade.

The area had no particular claim to fame with regard to objectives. The main attraction was that an attacker entering through the north-east had a covered approach to the road network to the west of Bad Windsheim. For a defender, there was little value in holding the covered approach since it was strategically insignificant, even if tactically important. Since the road network had open countryside to the west, it was much more tempting to set up an extensive kill zone covering this area.

Scenario by Jo Lima; Mike Johnstone | Map by William van der Sterren